


Abstract


Poor design and implementation of security in e-health devices leaves patient and their data vulnerable to different threats. These vulnerable devices can expose the entire digital healthcare infrastructure where they belong to the same security threats. Further, the defences of e-health devices and the entire healthcare network are not fully developed nor accomplished. With the motivation to protect patient's personal information and sensitive e-health data, in this work we performed in-depth security analysis of some well-known e-health devices. We also proposed an attack methodology to assess the security of any networked e-health device in general. As a case study we assessed the security of a CloudDX Pulsewave Monitor, Athos Wearable Fitness Apparel, Withings Wireless Blood Pressure Monitor.

Networked E-health Devices

- Any e-health device that has capability of connecting to the Internet.
- Collects data from the sensors, converts into digital format, display results and / or transmits data directly or indirectly to the server.
- Vulnerable Software components include - Web server, database server, application running on e-health devices and servers, communication links (USB, Bluetooth, Wireless).




Attack Methodology




1. Familiarize on how the device works.
2. Identify software components and type of communication links.
3. Analyze potential attack surfaces.
4. Establish a test environment and define attack scenarios
5. Perform the security testing

CloudDX Pulsewave Monitor




(a) Attack surfaces identified



(c) Man-in-the-middle attack leaks login credential login



(b) Controlling device with custom code



(d) Leaked readings in the network flow

Withings BPM


- Pre-static analysis of Withings BPM's mobile app:
 - App seems obfuscated with Dexguard
 - Some of the plist files are encrypted
 - Insecure Http urls
 - Found hardcoded key used for certificate pinning
 - Third party integrations also use hardcoded keys to connect to the server.




Athos Apparel




(a) Working of Athos Apparel




(a) Connecting to athos core



(c) Listing of Attributes



(b) Leaked athos information



(d) Reading battery information



(f) Data leak in plist

Conclusions and Future Work:

- The findings confirm that the tested devices are not developed with sufficient security in mind.
- Future works involves:
 - Thorough testing of mobile apps that are provided with e-health devices.
 - Designing automatic security assessment framework to test e-health devices.