

Security Vulnerabilities in Networked E-Health Devices Ratinder Kaur, Hugo Gonzalez, Ghazale Amel Zendehdel, Alina Matyukhina, Natalia Stakhanova


Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC), University of New Brunswick (UNB)

Abstract


Poor design and implementation of security in e-health devices leaves patient and their data vulnerable to different threats. These vulnerable devices can expose the entire digital healthcare infrastructure where they belong to the same security threats. Further, the defences of e-health devices and the entire healthcare network are not fully developed nor accomplished. With the motivation to protect patient's personal information and sensitive e-health data, in this work we performed in-depth security analysis of some well-known e-health devices. We also proposed an attack methodology to assess the security of any networked e-health device in general. As a case study we assessed the security of a CloudDX Pulsewave Monitor, Athos Wearable Fitness Apparel, Withings Wireless Blood Pressure Monitor.

Networked E-health Devices

- Any e-health device that has capability of connecting to the Internet.
- Collects data from the sensors, converts into digital format, display results and / or transmits data directly or indirectly to the server.




Attack Methodology



• Vulnerable Software components include - Web server, database server, application running on e-health devices and servers, communication links (USB, Bluetooth, Wireless).

- 1. Familiarize on how the device works.
- 2. Identify software components and type of communication links.
- 3. Analyze potential attack surfaces.
- 4. Establish a test environment and define attack scenarios
- 5. Perform the security testing

CloudDX Pulsewave Monitor




(a) Attack surfaces identified




1.1	
Content-Type	application/soap+msbin1
Host	services.pulsewavedx.com
Content-Length	441
Accept-Encoding	gzip, deflate
	>\x01a\x06V\x08D //tempuri.org/IAuthenticationService/AuthenticateD\x1a\xad\xda\\c\: iign_\x08UserName\x99\x08 <mark>hupoplo2</mark> \x01\x01\x01\x01
4	
View: auto _ & Raw	
POST https://services	.pulsewavedx.com/ClientServices/AuthenticationService.svc H
1.1	
1.1 Content-Type	application/soap+msbin1
1.1 Content-Type Host	services.pulsewavedx.com
1.1 Content-Type Host Content-Length	services.pulsewavedx.com 441
1.1 Content-Type Host	services.pulsewavedx.com
1.1 Content-Type Host Content-Length Accept-Encoding	services.pulsewavedx.com 441

(c) Man-in-the-middle attack leaks login credential login



Athos Apparel



(a) Working of Athos Apparel


	Core]# list-attributes
Primary	y Service
	/org/bluez/hci0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019
	4e137a00-c29d-436f-8190-733fc4b08abc
	Vendor specific
Charact	teristic
	/org/bluez/hc10/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019/char0026 4e137a05-c29d-436f-8190-733fc4b08abc Vendor specific
Charact	teristic
	/org/bluez/hci0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019/char0023 4e137a04-c29d-436f-8190-733fc4b08abc Vendor specific
Descrip	
	/org/bluez/hct0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019/char0023/desc0025 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb Client Characteristic Configuration
Charact	teristic
	/org/bluez/hct0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019/char0020 4e137a03-c29d-436f-8190-733fc4b08abc Vendor specific
Descri	
ococi q	/org/bluez/hci0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019/char0020/desc0022 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
	Client Characteristic Configuration
Charact	teristic
	/org/bluez/hci0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019/char001d 4e137a02-c29d-436f-8190-733Fc4b08abc Vendor specific
Descri	
	/org/bluez/hci0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019/char001d/desc001f 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb Client Characteristic Configuration
Charact	
	/org/bluez/hci0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019/char001a 4e137a01-c29d-436f-8190-733fc4b08abc Vendor specific
Descrip	
	/org/bluez/hci0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0019/char001a/desc001c 00002902-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
Deimaci	Client Characteristic Configuration / Service
Prenary	/ Service /org/bluez/hci0/dev_C1_32_8C_86_BE_F8/service0010

	pting t															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
CHG]	Attrib	ute /o	org/l	oluez/	/hci0/	'dev_	C1_32	_8C_8	6_BE_	F8/se	rvice	0019	/char@	001a	Value:	0x00
	Attrib															
CHG]	Attrib	ute /o	org/l	oluez/	/hci0/	'dev_	C1_32	_8C_8	6_BE_	F8/se	rvice	0019	/char@	001a	Value:	0x00
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib															
	Attrib													001a	Value:	0x00
c5	00 12 0	0 00 (00 00	00 0	00 00	00 0	00 0	00 00	00							
00																
Atho	s Core:	/servi	ice00	019/ch	ar001	[a]#	write							:har@		

(e) Writing random value to core

<plist <dict></dict></plist 	version="1.0">
dict>	<key>iCloudCoreDataUserPreference</key> <false></false>

(b) Controlling device with custom code



(d) Leaked readings in the network flow

Withings **BPM**

Pre-static analysis of Withings BPM's mobile app:

- App seems obfuscated with Dexguard
- Some of the plist files are encrypted
- Insecure Http urls
- Found hardcoded key used for certificate pinning
- Third party integrations also use hardcoded keys to connect to the server.





Conclusions and Future Work:

 The findings confirm that the tested devices are not developed with sufficient security in mind.

• Future works involves:

Thorough testing of mobile apps that are provided with e-health devices.
Designing automatic security assessment framework to test e-health devices.