

A Framework for Profiling and Detecting Android Financial Malware



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
OVERVIEW

▶ Problem: Android financial malware (AFM) exist because information about users and their activities has value and naturally money is a motivating factor. However, what constitutes AFM is still ambiguous



- Significance: A comprehensive understanding of the existing AFM attacks supported by a unified terminology is necessarily required for the deployment of reliable defence mechanisms against these attacks
- ▶ Goal: We focus on three aspects of AFM: analyzing the characteristics, profiling the behavior, and detecting the malware

WHAT IS ANDROID FINANCIAL MALWARE?



5 categories: banking malware,

ransomware, scareware, SMS

malware, and adware

HOW TO DETECT ANDROID FINANCIAL MALWARE?

Industry Solution

Adware

Notification Ads

Icon Ads

Company	Apps Name
AVG Mobile	AntiVirus FREE - Security Scan
Bitdefender	Mobile Security & Antivirus
Lookout Mobile	Security & Antivirus Lookout
Norton Mobile	Norton Security and Antivirus
Webroot Inc	Security - Free


Academic Research

Adware Banking Ransomware SMS-based Scareware




WHAT IS OUR SOLUTION?

Current Issues



Proposed Framework



WHAT DOES ANALYSIS TELL US?

Taxonomy Classification Comparison

Family Name	Year	Total	Proposed Taxonomy Labeling	AVG Majority Labeling
Kemoge	2015	100	Adware/NotificationAds/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android/Deng
Mobidash	2015	25	Adware/IconAds/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android/G2P
Citmo	2012	3	Banking/ActiveAttack/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android/Citmo
FakeBank	2014	151	Banking/PassiveAttack/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android/Deng
Koler	2014	74	Ransomware/Device-Locking/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android/Deng
Pletor	2014	16	Ransomware/Encryption-based/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android/Deng
FakeJobOffer	2013	7	Scareware/FakeServiceApps/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android/Fakejoboffer
FakePlayer	2010	25	Scareware/FakeSoftware/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android/G2M
Gazon	2015	1	SMS/Phishing/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android_dc
GGTracker	2011	11	SMS/Fraud/\textit{defined_family_name}	Android/G2P


Financial Charge Example

Financial Charge	Malware Family	$\begin{array}{c} {\rm Charge\ A mount} \\ {\rm (currency)} \end{array}$	Payment Option	$\begin{array}{c} { m Targeted} \\ { m Country} \end{array}$
Money Transfer (Ransom payment)	FakeDefender	99.98 (USD)	Credit Card	USA
	Koler	100-300 (USD)	MoneyPak Prepaid Cards	30 countries
	Pletor	15 (Euros) 100 (Rubles) 5000 (USD)	QIWI VISA MoneXy	13 countries
	ScarePakage	300 (USD)	MoneyPak	USA, UK, Germany
	SimpleLocker	20 - 200 (USD)	MoneXy	Ukraine, USA

Unique Phone number used by SMS Fraud

Malware Family	Phone No.	Total
FakePlayer	798657	2
GGTracker	99735	9
	1000	0
	10000	0
	10086	25
YZHCsms	100086	2
	123456	4
	617915	15
	19000101	2
	19860102	2
	19861119	2 2 0
	91316005	
	91316007	0
	101011101	2
	12345678911	25
	1065800885566	19
	052714034192100013309	0
	1240000089393100527140341001	21

SMS premium-rate number relationships



By devising the AFM taxonomy:

- one can gain a deep understanding of the complex characteristics and the unknown behavior of AFM.
- It can help in detecting the future malware threats.



In the future, we plan to:

- develop the framework of AFM detection based on profiles.
- build a prototype for evaluating the AFM detection system.